Intra-African Trade in 2026: Growth Is Real, but Friction Still Defines the Market

By 2026, intra-African trade has moved decisively beyond aspiration. Trade volumes are rising, political commitment to continental integration has deepened, and implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area has become a central feature of economic policy across the continent. This shift is reflected not only in political statements, but in sustained analysis by institutions such as the African Development Bank, UNECA, and Afreximbank, all of which report measurable growth in intra-African trade flows over recent years.

At the same time, these same institutions caution that Africa may be trading more with itself, but not yet efficiently, predictably, or inclusively. Afreximbank’s 2026 trade outlook and UNECA’s regional integration updates both point to a persistent gap between policy ambition and on-the-ground execution. Growth is real, but it remains constrained by structural frictions that continue to shape how goods move across borders.

Recent estimates cited in Afreximbank’s African Trade Report and reinforced by World Bank trade statistics suggest that intra-African trade has surpassed USD 200 billion in value. This expansion reflects stronger regional demand, gradual diversification beyond primary commodities, and early gains from AfCFTA tariff preferences. However, the distribution of these gains remains uneven. Countries with relatively stronger logistics systems, more automated customs environments, and established industrial bases are consistently capturing a larger share of intra-continental trade, a pattern highlighted in World Bank Logistics Performance assessments and UNECA corridor studies.

In this context, the African Continental Free Trade Area is no longer judged by the number of ratifications or legal instruments in place. Its credibility is increasingly assessed at border posts, ports, and transport corridors. This shift is echoed across policy briefs from UNECA, operational assessments by the World Bank, and practitioner-focused analysis published by tralac. The decisive questions are how long goods take to clear borders, how predictable compliance costs are, and whether traders can navigate customs procedures without unnecessary disruption.

Evidence from these sources shows that tariff liberalisation, while necessary, is insufficient on its own. Firms may qualify for zero-tariff treatment under AfCFTA rules of origin, yet still incur substantial losses due to administrative delays, inconsistent rule interpretation, and weak coordination between border agencies. The World Bank’s Trade Facilitation Indicators and UNECA’s border performance diagnostics consistently identify time and cost at the border as more binding constraints than tariffs themselves.

One of the most notable shifts in 2026 discourse has been the reframing of logistics as a core trade policy issue. Publications by Afreximbank, including its analysis on African shipping and trade finance, alongside commentary from the African Development Bank, increasingly emphasise the role of indirect shipping routes, port congestion, and fragmented transport networks in eroding competitiveness. Calls for direct intra-African shipping routes, coordinated corridor investment, and port modernisation now feature prominently in continental trade summits and policy forums, reflecting a growing consensus that logistics reform is central to AfCFTA success.

Industrialisation has also re-emerged as a defining pillar of intra-African trade strategy. UNECA’s Economic Report on Africa and AfDB’s industrialisation briefs both argue that AfCFTA’s long-term impact depends on its ability to support regional value chains and value-added production. Trade integration based primarily on raw materials risks reinforcing historical patterns of dependency rather than driving structural transformation. As a result, 2026 policy debates increasingly link trade liberalisation with manufacturing capacity, cross-border input sourcing, and regional production networks.

Despite these advances, small and medium-sized enterprises remain the most exposed to the system’s shortcomings. Research by UNECA, tralac, and the World Bank consistently shows that SMEs face disproportionately high compliance costs, limited access to trade finance, and persistent information asymmetries. Women- and youth-led enterprises are particularly affected, especially in contexts where informality at borders and discretionary enforcement of rules increases uncertainty and risk. Without deliberate policy design that reflects these realities, intra-African trade risks becoming dominated by larger firms with the capacity to absorb inefficiencies.

What emerges from the 2026 evidence is not a failure of AfCFTA, but a transition into a more demanding phase of integration. The era of vision-setting and treaty negotiation has given way to the harder work of execution. Africa now has a clearer understanding of where the real bottlenecks lie, informed by empirical data, corridor-level diagnostics, and firm-level surveys produced by continental and multilateral institutions.

The future of intra-African trade will therefore be determined less by new agreements and more by implementation credibility. Faster borders, predictable compliance costs, functional corridors, and accessible systems for smaller firms are no longer optional add-ons; they are prerequisites for inclusive trade-led growth. If these fundamentals improve, intra-African trade can support industrialisation and shared prosperity. If they do not, trade will continue to grow, but unevenly, reinforcing existing disparities rather than narrowing them.

In 2026, Africa’s trade challenge is no longer about vision or intent. It is about whether institutions, systems, and borders can deliver on promises already made.